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In a neoclassical economy with endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change 
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Grandville (2000) that the elasticity of substitution is a powerful engine of economic growth. 
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does not hinge on particular assumptions on how aggregate savings come about. It holds for 
any household sector allowing savings to grow at the same rate as aggregate output. 
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Is the measured degree of factor substitution an indicator for an economy's growth
potential? The debate surrounding this question began with the contributions by
de La Grandville (1989) and Klump and de La Grandville (2000). These authors
study the link between the elasticity of substitution, being treated as a parameter
of an aggregate CES production function, and economic growth in the neoclassical
economy of Solow (1956). They conclude that the degree of factor substitution
is a powerful engine of economic growth in the sense that a higher elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor leads to a higher growth rate along the
transition and a higher steady-state level of output per worker. This assessment has
been challenged by Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2003) and Irmen (2003). These
authors emphasize the role of the underlying savings hypothesis of Solow (1956)
and nd cases in a model of overlapping generations where a higher elasticity of
substitution is an impediment to growth.1
Such conicting results arise in a neoclassical setting since the elasticity of substitu-
tion aects the two main pillars on which aggregate one-sector models of economic
growth are based. First, there is a direct impact on aggregate production since
diering degrees of factor substitution aect the shape of the aggregate produc-
tion function. Second, there is an indirect eect on aggregate savings and capital
accumulation since the degree of factor substitution aects the functional income
distribution.
This paper takes a new look at the link between the elasticity of substitution and
economic growth from the perspective of the so-called Endogenous Growth Theory.
From this point of view the central question is whether and how the elasticity of
substitution aects the steady-state growth rate of an economy. I address this
question in a neoclassical economy with endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting
technical change. In this framework, I show that the elasticity of substitution is
a determinant of the long-run growth rate of an economy. More importantly, I
establish that a greater elasticity of substitution means faster steady-state growth
of per-worker variables. Although this nding conrms the spirit of the claim of
Klump and de La Granville, it is not subject to the above mentioned criticism. In
1Irmen and Klump (2009) reconcile these ndings by pointing out that the positive growth
eects of a high elasticity of substitution materialize as long as the propensity to save out of
capital income exceeds the propensity to save out of wage income. See Xue and Yip (2009) for a
comprehensive discussion surrounding the growth eects of the elasticity of substitution in one-
sector models of economic growth.
1fact, my steady-state result holds for any household sector that allows for a constant
aggregate consumption growth rate equal to the growth rate of the economy. Hence,
the eect of the elasticity of substitution through savings and capital accumulation
on the steady state, i.e., the second pillar of aggregate one-sector growth models, is
mute. To the best of my knowledge, the present paper is the rst that derives such
a result in an endogenous growth model.
I consider an economy in an innite sequence of periods described by an endogenous
growth model with capital- and labor-augmenting technical change. My analytical
framework is neoclassical since it maintains the assumptions of perfect competition,
of an aggregate production function with constant returns to scale and positive
and diminishing marginal products, and of capital accumulation. It has endoge-
nous growth since economic growth results from innovation investments undertaken
by prot-maximizing rms. To allow for innovation investments in capital- and
labor-augmenting technical change, I introduce two intermediate-good sectors, one
producing a capital-intensive intermediate, the other a labor-intensive intermediate.2
Innovation investments increase the productivity of capital and labor at the level
of these intermediate-good rms. Moreover, they feed into aggregate productivity
indicators that evolve cumulatively, i.e., in a way often referred to as `standing on
the shoulders of giants'.
Competitive nal-good rms use both intermediates and produce according to the
normalized CES production function of de La Grandville (1989) and Klump and
de La Grandville (2000). In equilibrium, the quantity of either intermediate-good
input is equal to the amount of capital and labor in eciency units. Therefore,
the elasticity of substitution of the CES of the nal-good sector coincides with
the (partial) elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, i.e., the one that
applies if the level of capital- and labor-augmenting technical change is kept constant.
The positive eect of a greater elasticity of substitution on the steady-state growth
rate appears as Theorem 1 in Section 3. It is derived in a series of steps. First, I
lay out the details of the competitive production sector and dene its equilibrium
in Section 2. Here, a central nding is that the equilibrium incentives to engage in
capital- and labor-augmenting technical change depend on the intensity with which
2The production sector extends and complements the one devised in Irmen (2005) by allowing
for capital-augmenting technical change. In turn, the latter builds on Hellwig and Irmen (2001) and
Bester and Petrakis (2003). See Acemoglu (2003) for an alternative model of endogenous capital-
and labor-augmenting technical change where innovation investments are nanced through rents
that accrue in an environment with monopolistic competition.
2both intermediates are used in the production of the nal good, and on the elasticity
of substitution between these intermediates. These dependencies arise since the price
that intermediate-good rms charge in equilibrium is equal to the marginal product
of the respective intermediate good they produce. As a consequence, this intensity
serves as the state variable of the whole production sector in each period.
In Section 3, I deal with the analysis of the steady-state. Along such a trajec-
tory all variables must grow at a constant rate. It follows that the ecient capital
intensity must be constant, too. Yet, the production sector alone does not pin
down the steady-state capital intensity. Therefore, I embed the production sec-
tor in the broader concept of a neoclassical economy with endogenous capital- and
labor-augmenting technical change by adding a dierence equation for capital ac-
cumulation and a resource constraint. For this setting, I establish that in a steady
state i) the growth rate of capital-augmenting technical change is zero, and ii) the
growth rate of output per worker is the growth rate of labor-augmenting technical
change. Both properties follow from the so-called Steady-State Growth Theorem of
Uzawa (1961), which applies here since aggregate innovation investments in capital-
and labor-augmenting technical change are proportionate to ecient capital and
ecient labor, respectively.
To establish the steady-state growth rate eect of the elasticity of substitution one
needs to account for both properties. Theorem 1 reveals that the driving force behind
it is the eciency eect of the elasticity of substitution established by Klump and
de La Grandville (2000): ceteris paribus, an increase in this elasticity increases out-
put. In the context of endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change,
this eciency eect implies faster steady-state growth.
2 The Competitive Production Sector
The production sector has a nal-good sector and an intermediate-good sector in
an innite sequence of periods t = 1;2;:::;1. The manufactured nal good can
be consumed or invested. If invested it may either become future capital or serve
as an input in current innovation activity undertaken by intermediate-good rms.
Intermediate-good rms produce one of two types of intermediates and sell it to
the nal-good sector. The production of the labor-intensive intermediate good uses
labor as the sole input, the only input in the production of the capital-intensive
intermediate good is capital. Labor- and capital-augmenting technical change is
the result of innovation investments undertaken by intermediate-good rms. Labor
and capital are supplied to the intermediate-good sector. The nal good serves as
num eraire.
32.1 The Final-Good Sector
The nal-good sector produces with the following CES production function F :
R2
+ ! R+,









where Yt is aggregate output in t, YK;t is the aggregate amount of the capital-
intensive intermediate input, and YL;t denotes the aggregate amount of the labor-
intensive intermediate input.3 The parameters satisfy   > 0, 1 >  > 0, and
1 >   >  1. Moreover,  = 1=(1    ) is the elasticity of substitution between
YK;t and YL;t. I show below that  is also the (partial) elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor. In terms of the labor-intensive intermediate-good input,
let yt = F (t;1)  f (t), where t  YK;t=YL;t. Then




t + (1   )
i1= 
: (2)
To identify the eect of the elasticity of substitution on otherwise identical economies,
I follow de La Grandville (1989) and Klump and de La Grandville (2000) and nor-
malize (2) by choosing some baseline values for the following variables:  ,  y = f ( ),
and the marginal rate of substitution  m = [f ( )    f0 ( )=f0 ( )] > 0. The nor-
malized CES production function that satises these criteria is then equal to (see,
Klump and de La Grandville (2000), eq. 5)
f () =  ()

()




 ()   y

 1   +  m




 1   +  m
: (4)
Also, I follow Klump and de La Grandville (2000) and denote partial derivatives of
f with respect to  by a prime so that f0
  @f=@ and @f0
=@  @2f=@@.
3I shall stick as close as possible to the notation of Klump and de La Grandville (2000). For
reasons that become obvious below, I have to replace their constants A and a by   and , respec-
tively. See Chapter 3 in de La Grandville (2009) for a careful derivation of the normalized CES
production function. Klump and Saam (2008) discuss how to calibrate the normalized CES in
dynamic macroeconomic models.
4In units of the nal good of period t the prot in t of the nal-good sector is
Yt   pK;tYK;t   pL;tYL;t; (5)
where pj;t, j = K;L, is the price of the respective intermediate factor. The nal-
good sector takes the sequence fpK;t;pL;tg
1
t=1 of factor prices as given and maximizes
the sum of the present discounted values of prots in all periods. Since it simply
buys both intermediates in each period, its maximization problem is equivalent to a
series of one-period maximization problems. Focussing on congurations where both
intermediates are used, the prot-maximizing rst-order conditions for t = 1;2;:::
are
YK;t : pK;t = f
0
 (t); (6)
YL;t : pL;t = f (t)   t f
0
 (t): (7)
2.2 The Intermediate-Good Sector
There are two dierent sets of intermediate-good rms, each represented by the set
R+ of nonnegative real numbers with Lebesgue measure. Intermediate-good rms
may either belong to the sector that produces the labor- or the capital-intensive
intermediate. In other words, they are part of the labor- or the capital-intensive
intermediate-good sector.
At any date t, all rms of a sector have access to the same sector-specic technology
with production function
yl;t = minf1;atltg or yk;t = minf1;btktg; (8)
where yl;t and yk;t is output, 1 a capacity limit,4 at and bt denote the rms' labor
and capital productivity in period t, lt and kt is the labor and the capital input.
The rms' respective labor and capital productivity is equal to
at = At 1(1    + q
A
t ) or bt = Bt 1(1    + q
B
t ); (9)
here At 1 > 0 and Bt 1 > 0 denote aggregate indicators of the level of technological
knowledge to which innovating rms in period t have access for free. Naturally,
4The assumption of a capacity constraint is by no means restrictive for my results. The capacity
choice may be endogenized along the lines of Hellwig and Irmen (2001).
5 2 (0;1) is the rate of depreciation of technological knowledge in both sectors, and
qA
t and qB
t are indicators of productivity growth gross of depreciation.
To achieve a productivity growth rate q
j
t > 0, j = A;B, a rm must invest i(q
j
t)
units of the nal good in period t. The function i : R+ ! R+ is the same for
both sectors, time invariant, C2, and strictly convex. Moreover, with the notation


















Hence, higher rates of productivity growth require ever-growing investments.
If a rm innovates, the assumption is that an innovation in period t is proprietary
knowledge of the rm only in t, i.e., in the period when the innovation materializes.
Subsequently, the innovation becomes embodied in the sector specic productivity
indicators (At;Bt), (At+1;Bt+1);:::; with no further scope for proprietary exploita-
tion. The evolution of these indicators will be specied below.5
Per-period prots in units of the current nal good are
L;t = pL;t yl;t   wt lt   i(q
A
t ); K;t = pK;t yk;t   Rt kt   i(q
B
t ); (11)
where pL;t yl;t, pK;t yk;t is the respective rm's revenue from output sales, wtlt, Rtkt
its wage bill at the real wage rate wt and its capital cost at the real rental rate of
capital Rt, and i(q
j
t), j = A;B, its investment outlays.
Firms choose a production plan (yl;t;lt;qA
t ) or (yk;t;kt;qB
t ) taking the sequence
fpL;t;pK;t;wt;Rtg1
t=1 of real prices and the sequence fAt 1;Bt 1g1
t=1 of aggregate
productivity indicators as given. They choose a production plan that maximizes the
sum of the present discounted values of prots in all periods. Because production
choices for dierent periods are independent of each other, for each period t, they
choose the plan (yl;t;lt;qA
t ) and (yk;t;kt;qB
t ) that maximizes the prot L;t and K;t,
respectively.
If a rm innovates, it incurs an investment cost i(q
j
t) > 0 that is associated with a
given innovation rate q
j
t > 0 and is independent of the output yl;t or yk;t. An inno-
vation investment is only prot-maximizing if the rm's margin is strictly positive,
i.e., if pL;t > wt=at or pK;t > Rt=bt. Then, there is a positive scale eect, namely if
5As will become clear below, all rms innovate in equilibrium since i(0) = limqj!0 i0  
qj
= 0.
To save space, I shall disregard throughout the discussion of what would happen if rms did not
innovate. Details on this are available from the author upon request.
6the rm innovates, it wants to apply the innovation to as large an output as possible
and produces at the capacity limit, i.e., yl;t = 1 or yk;t = 1. The choice of (lt;qA
t ) and
(kt;qB
t ) must then minimize the costs of producing the capacity output. Assuming
wt > 0 and Rt > 0 these input combinations satisfy
lt =
1

































Given the convexity of the innovation cost function and the fact that limqj!0 i0(qj) =
0, the conditions (13) determine a unique level ^ qA
t > 0 and ^ qB
t > 0 as the solution
to the rst-order conditions
wt
At 1(1    + ^ qA








Bt 1(1    + ^ qB







The latter relate the marginal reduction of a rm's wage bill/capital cost to the
marginal increase in its investment costs.
Recall that the set of each intermediate-good sector is R+ with Lebesgue measure.
Then, the maximum prot of any intermediate-good rm producing the labor- or
the capital-intensive intermediate must be zero at any t. Indeed, since the supply
of labor and capital is bounded in each period, the set of intermediate-good rms
employing more than some " > 0 units of labor or capital must have bounded
measure and hence must be smaller than the set of all intermediate-good rms.
Given that inactive intermediate-good rms must be maximizing prots just like
the active ones, we need that maximum prots of all active intermediate-good rms
at equilibrium prices are equal to zero.
Using (11), (12), and (14), we nd that for prot-maximizing intermediate-good
rms earning zero prots in equilibrium, it holds that





t ) + i(^ q
A





t ) + i(^ q
B
t ); (15)
i.e., the price is equal to variable costs plus xed costs when wt=at and Rt=bt are
consistent with prot-maximization as required by (14). Upon combining the equi-
librium conditions of the nal-good sector and both intermediate-good sectors we
nd the following proposition.
7Proposition 1 If (6), (7), and (15) hold, then there are maps, gA : R2
++ ! R++
and gB : R2
++ ! R++, such that ^ qA
t = gA (t;) > 0 and ^ qB
t = gB (t;) > 0 for
any (t;) 2 R2
++.
Proof Upon substitution of (6) and (7) in the respective zero-prot condition of
(15) gives
f (t)   t f
0















t ) + i(^ q
B
t ): (17)
Denote the right-hand side of both conditions by RHS (^ qj), j = A;B. Due to the
properties of the function i dened in (10), the range of RHS (^ qj) is R+. Moreover,
RHS0 (^ qj) > 0 on R+.
Similarly, denote by LHSj (t;), j = A;B, the left-hand sides of these condi-
tions. Due to the properties of the CES function, LHSj (t;) is continuous and
strictly positive on R++. Hence, for any pair (t;) 2 R2
++ there is a unique
^ qA
t = gA (t;) > 0 that satises (16) and a unique ^ qB
t = gB (t;) > 0 that
satises (17). 
Proposition 1 emphasizes two important properties of the production sector. First,
the equilibrium incentives to engage in labor- and capital-augmenting technical
change depend on the factor intensity of the nal-good sector and on the elasticity
of substitution. Second, for all (t;) 2 R2
++, we have ^ qA
t > 0 and ^ qB
t > 0.
The rst property is due to the fact that pK;t and pL;t depend on t and  according
to (6) and (7). This dependency feeds back onto ^ qA
t and ^ qB
t through the zero-
prot condition (15). The second property hinges on the characteristics of the input
requirement function given in (10). If i(0) > 0, then maximum prots of innovating
rms could be strictly negative even at low levels of ^ q
j
t > 0. Then, these rms
would not enter and the intermediate-good production of the respective sector would
collapse. If i0(0) > 0, then the rst marginal unit of qj would no longer be costless.
Consequently, the cost-minimization problem (13) would not necessarily admit an
interior solution. Indeed, rms would choose ^ q
j
t = 0 if the marginal reduction of
their wage bill/capital cost at qj = 0 was smaller than i0(0).
2.3 Evolution of Technological Knowledge
The evolution of the economy's level of technological knowledge is given by the evo-
lution of the aggregate indicators (At;Bt) 2 R2
++. Labor- and capital-augmenting
8productivity growth occurs at the level of those intermediate-good rms that pro-
duce at t. Denoting the measure of these rms by nt and mt, respectively, their
contribution to At and Bt is equal to the highest level of labor and capital produc-
tivity attained by one of them, i.e.,
At = maxfat(n) = At 1
 






Bt = maxfbt(m) = Bt 1
 





Since in equilibrium qA
t (n) = qA
t and qB
t (m) = qB
t , we have at = At 1
 
1    + qA
t

and bt = Bt 1
 
1    + qB
t

. Hence, for all t = 1;2;:::
At = At 1
 




and Bt = Bt 1
 





with A0 > 0 and B0 > 0 as initial conditions.
2.4 Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium of the Production
Sector
For given sequences of capital fKtg1
t=1, Kt 2 R++, and labor Lt = L1 (1 + gL)
t 1,
gL > ( 1), L1 > 0, the dynamic competitive equilibrium of the production sec-
tor determines a sequence of prices fpL;t;pK;t;wt;Rtg
1




t=1, and a sequence of indicators of
the level of technological knowledge fAt 1;Bt 1g1
t=1.
Denition 1 In a dynamic competitive equilibrium of the production sector, the
above mentioned sequences satisfy the following conditions:
(E1) At all t, all rms maximize prots and earn zero-prots.
(E2) At all t, the market for both intermediates clears, i.e.,
YL;t = nt and YK;t = mt: (20)
(E3) At all t, there is full employment of labor and capital, i.e.,
ntlt = Lt and mtkt = Kt: (21)
(E4) The productivity indicators At and Bt evolve according to (19) with A0 > 0
and B0 > 0 as initial conditions.
9Condition (E1) is satised if Proposition 1 holds. (E2) and (E3) require market
clearing of the market for both intermediates and both factors. To avoid more
complicated notation, the market-clearing conditions (20) and (21) use the fact that
all entering intermediate-good rms at t produce the capacity output and hire the
same amount of workers and capital, respectively.
By (12) the equilibrium amount of labor and capital employed by some intermediate-
good rm is lt = 1=At 1
 
1    + qA
t

and kt = 1=Bt 1
 




(E3), nt = At 1
 
1    + qA
t

Lt and mt = Bt 1
 
1    + qB
t


















Hence, at a semantic level, technical change is capital- and labor-saving at the level
of the individual rm and capital- and labor-augmenting at the level of economic ag-
gregates. If, ceteris paribus, At 1 and Bt 1 increase, the capacity output is produced
with less labor and less capital. At the aggregate level, these gains in productivity
translate into more entry through the requirement of full employment of labor and
capital. Accordingly, aggregate output of each intermediate-good is equal to the
respective input in eciency units, and a higher At or Bt is equivalent to having
more labor or capital, respectively.
Moreover, from (22) we have in equilibrium





















The relative marginal product of capital decreases in its relative abundance, Kt=Lt.
This is the substitution eect, and  is the partial elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor. `Partial' refers to the fact that Bt=At remains constant. However,
changes in the relative abundance of capital induce technical change. To see how,




1    + gB (t)





10The latter implicitly denes a functional relationship between t and Kt=Lt charac-















1    + gA(t;)





1    + gB(t;)
< 0; (27)
are the elasticities of the equilibrium growth factors with respect to t. With these
relationships at hand, it is straightforward to derive the total elasticity of substi-
tution, ^ , as a measure of the relative change in the relative marginal product of
capital to the relative change in the relative abundance of capital taking induced
innovation into account, i.e.,















Hence, ^  =  either if  = 1 or if "A
 = "B
 = 0. In the former case, nal-good
production is Cobb-Douglas, and the term Bt=At vanishes in (24). In the latter
case, rms do not respond to changes in t, and technical change would be either
absent or exogenous. It is worth noting that (28) implies ^  R 1 ,  R 1. Hence,
intermediates are gross complements (substitutes) whenever capital and labor are
gross complements.
To prepare for the steady-state analysis, we state and prove the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 2 Let t be the state variable that determines the behavior of the pro-
duction sector in t. Given a sequence ftg1
t=1, t 2 R++, there is a unique dynamic
equilibrium that satises Denition 1.
Proof In total there are 19 variables and 19 equations. By (6) and (7) the prices
pL;t and pK;t depend on t. Proposition 1 shows that ^ qA
t and ^ qB
t depend on t. Then,
an application of the equilibrium conditions of Denition 1 reveals that lt, kt, wt,
Rt, at, bt, At, Bt, nt, mt, YK;t, YL;t, Yt depend on t through either ^ qA
t or ^ qB
t . Recall
that yl;t = yk;t = 1 for all t  1 in accordance with Proposition 1. 
113 Steady-State Analysis
I dene a steady state, or equivalently a balanced growth path, as a path along
which all variables mentioned in Denition 1 grow at constant exponential rates
(possibly zero) for all t    1.
It is immediate from Proposition 1 and 2 that in a steady state t =  and both
rates, ^ qA
t and ^ qB
t , are constant. Yet, the dynamic competitive equilibrium of the pro-
duction sector on its own does not pin down . Therefore, I embed the production
sector into a richer macroeconomic environment that accounts for capital investment
and a resource constraint. I refer to this environment as the neoclassical economy
with endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change. This environment
delivers a single steady-state condition for . With this condition at hand, I study
the role of the elasticity of substitution for steady-state growth.
Denition 2 The neoclassical economy with endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting
technical change is dened by the following environment:
1. The (normalized) CES production function (1)
Yt = F (BtKt;AtLt) =  ()
h
 () (BtKt)




2. Capital accumulation according to
Kt+1 = I
K
t + (1   
K)Kt; K1 > 0; (30)
where IK
t > 0 is gross investment of current output in the capital stock, K 2
[0;1] is the depreciation rate of capital, and K1 > 0 the initial condition.
3. Two indicators of technological knowledge, At and Bt, that evolve according to
(19).
4. Innovation investments of current output, IA
t > 0 and IB
t > 0, are necessary
and sucient for qA
t > 0 and qB
t > 0. Moreover,
I
A















5. A resource constraint according to which consumption, Ct > 0, gross invest-
ment in the capital stock, IK
t > 0, and innovation investments, IA
t > 0 and
IB







t = Yt: (32)
126. The labor force grows at a constant rate gL > ( 1), i.e., Lt = L1(1 + gL)t 1
with L1 > 0 as initial condition.
Denition 2 adds capital accumulation according to (30) and the resource constraint
(32) to the production sector of Section 2. Moreover, it uses equilibrium conditions.
In accordance with (22), we replace YL;t and YK;t by AtLt and BtKt in (29) and use
(E2) to conclude that IA





















in (31). In addition to consumption, the three ways to invest current output show
up on the left-hand side of the resource constraint (32).
The following proposition establishes the key properties of a steady state in a neo-
classical economy with endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change.
Proposition 3 Suppose the neoclassical economy with endogenous capital- and labor-
augmenting technical change exhibits a steady state starting at period  with IK
t > 0,
IA
t > 0, IB
t > 0 for t  . Then, for all t  
Yt = F (B Kt;At Lt) =  ()
h
 () (BKt)




and output per worker grows at rate
g
  q
A   : (34)
Proof For a steady state, the evolution of At and Bt as given by (19) requires
qA
t = qA and qB
t = qB for all t  . Since I
j
t > 0 we have qj > 0, j = A;B.
With this in mind, the neoclassical economy with endogenous capital- and labor-
augmenting technical change is isomorphic to the environment to which the Steady-
State Theorem of Uzawa (1961) applies.












Dene net output as









One readily veries that the net production function ~ F has constant returns to scale
in Kt and Lt, and, using (16), (17) and and the properties of f and i, positive and
diminishing marginal products of Kt and Lt.
Hence, the environment described by (i) ~ Yt = ~ F (BtKt;AtLt), (ii) the resource
constraint Ct+IK
t = ~ Yt, (iii) capital accumulation according to (30), and (iv) growth
13of the labor force at a constant rate is the one to which the Steady-State Growth
Theorem of Uzawa (1961) applies (see, Schlicht (2006) and Jones and Scrimgeour
(2008)). Hence, in a steady-state it must be that qB =  and g = qA   . 
Proposition 3 states that in a steady state the growth rate of output per worker
coincides with the net growth rate of labor-saving technical change g; there is no
capital-saving technical progress, i.e., Bt = B for all t  .6 These ndings mimic
the predictions of the so-called Steady-State Growth Theorem of Uzawa (1961). In
fact, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that in a steady state, the neoclassical economy
of Denition 2 is isomorphic to the environment to which Uzawa's theorem applies.
This is due to the fact that aggregate innovation investments in capital- and labor-
augmenting technical change are proportionate to ecient capital and ecient labor,
respectively. If such an economy is equipped with the production sector of Section 2,






A    = g
A (
;)   : (37)
The rst of these conditions pins down the steady-sate capital intensity , the
second gives the steady-sate growth rate of output per worker. This is quite re-
markable: the steady-state intensity of ecient capital per unit of ecient labor
and the steady-state growth rate of the economy depend only on parameters that
characterize the economy's production sector. The following theorem exploits this
fact.
Theorem 1 Consider two neoclassical economies with endogenous capital- and labor-
augmenting technical change equipped with a production sector set out in Section 2.
Let these economies dier only with respect to . Then, the economy with the greater
 experiences faster steady-state growth of output per worker.
Proof From (37) a change in  aects  since such a change must leave gB un-
aected. Denote this relationship by  = (). An application of the implicit











6Observe that Bt = B means that innovation investments in capital-augmenting technical
occur in the steady state. In fact, they are equal to IB
t = BKt i() and oset the eect of
depreciation on B.
14where the argument of f is .
To study the eect of  on the growth rate of output per worker, write g =
























@    @f0

@
(1    + gA)i00 (gA) + 2i0 (gA)
; (41)
where the argument of gA is (;) and the argument of f is . Upon substitution






(1    + gA)i00 (gA) + 2i0 (gA)
> 0: (42)
The sign of dg=d follows since sign[@f ()=@] > 0 for  6=   in accordance
with the proof of Theorem 1 of Klump and de La Grandville (2000). 








For the Theorem to hold this expression must increase in . Since the steady
state requires () to adjust such that  = gB (();), changing  must leave
gB (();) constant. Hence, from (17), f0
 (()) must remain unchanged. Then,
changing  has two eects on (43). First, there are two (indirect) eects through
a change of () which cancel out. Second, there is the (direct) eciency eect
identied by Klump and de La Grandville (2000), i.e., @f (())=@ > 0 for
  6= . Hence, it is due to the eciency eect that the economy with the greater
elasticity of substitution has faster steady-state growth of output per worker.
It is worth noting that Theorem 1 does not depend on the assumption that the
requirement functions, i, is the same in both sectors. If, for some reason, the inno-











with  6= , then  becomes a parameter of gA
and  one of gB. Accordingly, the steady-state ecient capital intensity and the
15steady-state growth rate of output per worker depend on these parameters in accor-
dance with (37). However, the qualitative eect of the elasticity of substitution on
steady-state growth remains unaected.
Theorem 1 is also robust with respect to modications in the way the indicators At
and Bt evolve. For instance, I assume in (18) that their evolution depends only on
the innovation activity of the respective sector. To relax this assumption, one may
allow for spillovers. As long as these are not too strong, e.g., such that the evolution
of At depends only on the innovation investments in capital-augmenting technical
change and vice versa, the steady-sate growth eects of the elasticity of substitution
remain valid.7
Finally, the growth eect of Theorem 1 may also be related to the total elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor.
Corollary 1 If the production technology of two economies is characterized by 2 >
1 and both partial elasticities of substitution are close to unity, then ^ 2 > ^ 1 and
the economy with the greater total elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
has the higher steady-state growth rate.
























Evaluated at  = 1, we have d^ =d = 1: In view of Theorem 1, Corollary 1 follows
immediately. 
Hence, if we believe to measure the total rather than the partial elasticity of sub-
stitution, the prediction of faster steady-state growth under a greater elasticity of
substitution remains valid. Though, since little is known about the derivatives
@"j
=@, j = A;B, this result may only be locally valid.
7For instance, one may replace (18) by At = At 1
 
1    + qA
t
  






1    + qB
t
  
1    + qA
t

, with  > 0 and  2 [0;]. Here,  measures the strength of
the spillover from current research in one sector on the productivity indicator of the other sector.
Details are available upon request.
164 Concluding Remarks
This paper suggests that there are new eects linking the predicted growth perfor-
mance of an economy to the elasticity of substitution once we leave the setting of one-
sector growth models of de La Grandville (1989) and Klump and de La Grandville
(2000). In the three-sector economy under scrutiny here the direction of technical
change, i.e., the economy's choice between capital- and labor-augmenting technical
change, is endogenous. I nd that an economy with a greater elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and labor has a greater steady-state growth rate of output per
worker. This is due to the eciency eect of the elasticity of substitution of Klump
and de La Grandville (2000), i.e., for a given ecient capital intensity, output per
ecient labor increases in the elasticity of substitution. In the present context, in-
novation investments that raise the productivity of labor become more protable
due to the eciency eect. Therefore, the steady-state growth rate is higher.
Unlike other channels linking the elasticity of substitution to a country's growth
performance, the central result of this paper does not depend on particular assump-
tions on the household side of the economy. All relevant steady-state conditions
on growth rates follow from Uzawa's Steady-State Growth Theorem. Theorem 1
derives a great deal of its generality from this fact. The price, however, is that it
does not include predictions concerning transitional dynamics. These will depend
on the way the household sector is modeled. Finding out whether and how the
elasticity of substitution aects these dynamics is not a trivial task. I leave it for
future research.8
8Adding Solow's savings hypothesis to the production sector of Section 2 leads to a two-
dimensional dynamical system of rst-order, autonomous, and non-linear dierence equations.
Calibration exercises for reasonable parameter values indicate that the steady state may be locally
stable for values of  close to unity. Details are available from the author upon request.
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